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COMMENTS AND NOTES
DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE SOCIAL
CLUBS: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Racial and religious discrimination limiting the access of minority
groups to education, vocational training, housing, and other facilities
has come under increasing attack in the United States over the last 20
years.' A broadening of the scope of public interest and a
corresponding narrowing of protected private interests have led to
increased municipal, state, and federal limitations on "permissible"
or legally protected racial and religious discrimination.
Although public accommodation laws have been enacted by the
federal government, 2 37 states, 3 and the District of Columbia,4 each
I. The modern era in anti-discrimination law can be traced from Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). That decision marks the advent of active governmental
involvement in the protection of human rights. See A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968). The
activist Supreme Court led the way throughout the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Court was
joined in 1957 by Congress when it enacted the first civil rights statute since 1875, the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C. (1964)).
Recently, Congress has enacted three major civil rights acts: The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
dealing with public accommodations, employment, and school -desegregation, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1964); The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p
(Supp. V, 1970); and The Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp. V, 1970).
The Court, for its part, has both rediscovered and reinvigorated the Ciyil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, 14 Stat. 27, and suggested that Congress has the constitutional power to reach certain private
discrimination under the enabling sections of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. See
notes 192-95 infra and accompanying text.
2. Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6 (1964).
3. ALAS. STAT. §§ 18.80.010-.300 (1969), as amended, §§ 18.80.145-.220 (1970); Aliz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1401 to -1485 (Supp. 1970); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-53 (West Supp.
1969),formerly ch. 413, §§ 1-4 [1905] Cal. Stat. 553; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1-1 to -3-
6, 80-21-1 to -8 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1965, 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-122 to
-128 (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-34 to -37 (1958), as
amended. §§ 53-35 to -36 (Supp. 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501-16 (Supp. 1968);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-7301 to -7303 (Supp. 1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, § 9, ch.
38, §§ 13-1 to -4 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-901 to -902 (1956), as amended, (Supp.
1969); InD. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2307 to -2317 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1969); IOWA
CODE §§ 105A.I-.12 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to 1013 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. 1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.120-140 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 1301 to 1301-A (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 1-15 (1968), as amended,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 1-16 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1-10
(1965), as amended, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1-9 (Supp. 1969); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
272, §§ 92A, 98 (1968); MICH, CONST. art. 5, § 29; MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 16.575-
.577 (1967); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.1-.9 (1967); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
1181
1182 DUKE LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 1970:1181
statute has heretofore exempted private clubs either specifically" or
through restricted definitions of public accommodations. 6 The
availability of the statutory private club exception has produced
considerable litigation concerning what is or is not a private club.7 A
brief outline of the judicial standards for determining whether an
organization qualifies as a private club should indicate the breadth of
this form of permissible discrimination.8
PRIVATE CLUBS VERSUS PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
Two factors are central to any substantive separation of private
clubs from public accommodations: membership practices and
ownership and control
§§ 750.146-.147 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.09 (1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.13
(1966), as amended, (Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 314.010-.080 (Supp. 1970); MONT,
REV. CODES ANN. § 64-211 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-301 to -303 (Supp.
1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-101 to -102 (1962), as amended, NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-101 to -
104 (Supp. 1967); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 233.010-.080 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-
A:1-14 (1966), as amended, §§ 354-A:3, -A:8 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1-2 to
-7 (1960), tit. 18, §§ 25-1 to -28 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-33-1 to -13 (Supp.
1969); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS IAW §§ 40-41 (1948), as amended, §§ 40-c to -h, 41, 44a (Supp.
1970); N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (1951), as amended, (Supp. 1970); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 513-15, 517 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-30 (Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2901.35-.36 (Page 1954); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1965), as
amended, (Page Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1400-02 (Supp. 1970); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 30.670-.680, 659.010-.115 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654 (1963); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-24-1
to -6 (1969), 28-5-1 to -39 (1968); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-12-1 to -3 (1967), as
amended, (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, §§ 1451-52 (1958), as amended, §§ 1452-53 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.91.010
(1957); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010-.320 (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 942.04 (1958), as amended, § 942.04(3) (Supp. 1970); WYo. STAT. ANN, §§ 6-83.1
to .2 (Supp. 1969). Those states without public accommodations laws are Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
4. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2901 to -2911 (1961).
5. Seventeen states specifically mention and exempt private clubs. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:1-2 to 1-7, 18:25-I to 25-8 (1960); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (McKinney
1948).
6. Twenty states do not specifically mention private clubs. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 4502 (Supp. 1968); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.35-.36 (Page 1954); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 1451-52 (1958).
7. The accounts of businesses which suddenly became private clubs in 1964 are numerous.
See, e.g., Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Jan. 24, 1965, at 14, col. 1; Dallas Morning News,
July 4, 1964, § 1, at 7, col. 6; St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 9, 1964, at IA, col. 1; The Wall St.
Journal, July 22, 1964, at 1, col. 4; Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1964, § A, at 6, col. 4.
8. For more detailed treatment of private club standards see Note, Public Accommodations
Law and the Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915 (1966); Note, The Private Club Exemption to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1112 (1969).
9. The articles cited in note 8 supra indicate that the courts have relied on some thirteen
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Membership Criteria
The legislative history of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196410
which exempts clubs and other establishments that are not in fact
open to the public" indicates that to be considered a private club an
organization must exercise some selectivity in choosing its members.12
The absence of genuine selectivity is inconsistent with privacy and the
concept of a club. Where a purported private club has no formal
membership selection procedures, 13 exacts only minimal dues, 4 or
disregards its own member-non-member distinctions and offers its
facilities as a matter of course to non-members, 5 it is likely to be held
a sham club.
More recent cases have indicated that an offer to serve all white
individuals within a defined geographic area is inconsistent with the
nature of a truly private club. Although the YMCA health and
athletic clubs of Raleigh, North Carolina, enforced membership
application procedures and elicited substantial dues, they failed to
qualify as private clubs because there were no limits on white
membership and no standards for admissibility within the geographic
area." In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. 7 the Supreme Court
separate characteristics to distinguish a public accommodation from a private club. See 44
N.Y.U.L. REV., supra note 8, at 1117-18. The text represents only a short summary of the major
factors considered in such analysis.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6 (1964).
11. Id. § 2000a(e).
12. Senator Humphrey stated that the private club exception was designed to protect only
"the genuine privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose membership is genuinely
selective on some reasonable basis." 110 CONG. REc. 13697 (1964). See also Id. at 7407
(remarks of Senator Magnuson).
13. See, e.g., Stout v. YMCA, 404 F.2d 687, 688 (5th Cir. 1968); Brackeen v. Ruhlman, 3
RAcE REL. L. REP. 45, 47 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Holiday Sands, Inc., 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 2025,
2028 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm. 1964). The mere presence of formal procedures thinly
disguising a discriminatory scheme did not satisfy the court in United States v. Clarksdale King
& Anderson Co., 288 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
14. "Most private clubs have annual dues in a substantial amount. The defendants have no
dues but merely charge each applicant 100 as an admission fee, good for life." Bradshaw v.
Whigam, I I RAcE REL. L. REP. 934,936 (S.D. Fla. 1966). See also Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf
Club, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (no dues); Brackeen v. Ruhlman, 3 RACE
REL. L. REP. 45,48 (Pa. C.P. 1957) (no dues).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. La.
1967); Sutton v. Capitol Club, Inc., 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 791, 792 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Gillespie
v. Lake Shore Golf Club, Inc., 91 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
16. Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968) "[S]erving or offering to serve all the
members of the white population within a defined geographical area is certainly inconsistent
with the nature of a truly private club." Id. at 102, quoting, 62 Nw. U.L. Rev. 244, 246 (1967).
17. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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held that a nonstock membership corporation organized to operate
community park and playground facilities was not a private social
club since race was its only selective element.
Ownership and Control
Ownership of club facilities by and for the benefit of all club
members is more consistent with traditional notions of the private
club than proprietary operation for the profit of one or a few owners. 8
In addition, control by the membership in such areas as the selection
of new members" and the making of club rules and policies" are
probably essential to the existence of a private club. 2' Oklahoma,
having observed the experience of other states for many years, in 1968
passed the most recent public accommodations law.2 In proscribing
discrimination in places of public accommodation Oklahoma defined
a private club in the following terms:
"[A] private club is not a place of public accommodation, if its policies are
determined by its members and its facilities or services are available only to its
members and their bona fide guests.=
Social Clubs
Left unscathed by the various public accommodations laws and
the evolving judicial definition of the private club are the wide variety
18. Justice Brennan writing for the Court in Daniel v. Paul observed that the establishment
under consideration was "simply a business operated for a profit with none of the attributes of
self-government and member-ownership traditionally associated with private clubs." 395 U.S.
298, 301 (1969). See also United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968). See
generally Pasley, Exclusion and Expulsion from Non-Profit Organizations-The Civil Rights
Aspect, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 203, 216 (1965).
19. It is difficult to see how the admissions policy can reflect the associational preferences of
the existing members unless those members determine who is to be admitted. "A private club
customarily consists of individuals who, through committee action or membership action or
both, approve and select their membership." Bradshaw v. Whigam, I I RACE REL. L. REP. 934,
936 (S.D. Fla. 1966). See also Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D. Md.
1966).
20. See, e.g., Holiday Sands, Inc., 9 RAcE REL. L. REP. 2025, 2029 (Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n 1964); Brackeen v. Ruhlman, 3 RAcE REL. L. REp. 45,48 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
21. In Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966),
decided under a New Jersey public accommodations law which exempts "bona fide private
clubs," a swim club owned by a corporation and operated for a profit refused to admit a black
applicant because of his race. There was a substantial membership fee and membership was
limited to 400 families. The court, nevertheless, found this club to be a public accommodation
largely because the business was operated for the profit of the owners and controlled by the
shareholders, not the members.
22. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401-02 (Supp. 1968).
23. Id. § 1401(l)(i).
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of private social clubs which exist in this country in the form of
suburban golf and country clubs, fraternal societies, athletic clubs,
and downtown or city clubs. 24  Most of these meet the
"exclusiveness ' 25 and "internal control ' 26 criteria. They are in
danger of being termed public accommodations only so far as they are
owned and operated for a profit by other than their members or
relinquish their "exclusiveness" in some other manner such as
advertising generally to the public.27
A unique inroad into this form of "permissible" racial and
religious discrimination was made recently when Maine added to its
state statute forbidding discrimination in places of public
accommodation the following provision which effectively prohibits
racial and religious discrimination in many private social clubs:
No person, firm, or corporation holding a license under the State of Maine
or any of its subdivisions for the dispensing of food, liquor or for any service or
being a State of Maine corporation authorized to do business in the State shall
withhold membership, its facilities or services to any person on account of race,
religion or national origin, except such organizations which are oriented to a
particular religion or which are ethnic in character3'
24. There were approximately 3,300 country clubs in 1962, with the number estimated to be
growing by 100 each year. Boyle, The Ways of Life at the Country Club-Part I. SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 26, 1962, at 52-53. The National Intrafraternity Conference in 1958
included some 61 national groups having local chapters at various colleges and universities. B.
EPSTEIN & A. FORESTER, "SOME OF My BEST FRIENDS. . ." 165 (1962). In addition, of course,
there are local fraternities at many campuses. One author reports that there are "exclusive
upper class men's clubs in most major cities" in addition to those in smaller cities. E. BALTZELL,
PHILADELPHIA GENTLEMEN 338 (1958). Metropolitan athletic clubs have been founded in 38 of
the 130 American cities with a population of 100,000 or more. Discrimination in Athletic Clubs,
RIGHTS. June, 1968, at 130. See generally The Wall St. Journal, Sept. 10, 1969, at 1, col. i.
25. See generally E. BALTZELL, supra note 24, at 338-45; The Wall St. Journal, Apr. 9, 1970,
at I, col. 5.
26. Approximately 90 percent of the country clubs operating in 1962 were member-owned.
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 26, 1962, at 52.
27. See, e.g., Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jack
Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. La. 1967); Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v.
Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966).
28. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1301(A) (Supp. 1969). Another Maine statute provides
that "[n]o person, corporation, firm or copartnership shall conduct, control, manage or operate,
for compensation, directly or indirectly. . . any eating. . . place. . . unless the same shall be
licensed by the department." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2482 (1965). This would seem to
preclude avoidance of the statute in the sale of food by a change in accounting practices. What is
illegal is the taking of compensation for the operation of an eating place without a license. The
Maine laws also provide that liquor cannot be sold without a license, id. tit. 28, § 1055, and
provide specifically for licenses to be issued to clubs, id. tit. 28, § 701, as defined in id. tit. 28, §
2(4). The final sentence of the aniendment excepting "organizations. . .oriented to a particular
religion or which are ethnic in character" probably was included to insure against infringing
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The exemption of private clubs, and more particularly private
social clubs, from the operation of public accommodations laws has
been premised upon the rights of freedom of association and privacy. 2'
The assumption is made that the right to freedom of association or
some concept of privacy protects not only the right to associate in a
private club with others for social or recreational purposes but also
the right to exclude from that association anyone for any arbitrary
reason. The Maine statute may present the first real test of the
breadth of the constitutional rights to freedom of association and
privacy in the private social club context.
This comment will examine the development of the rights to
freedom of association and privacy with special attention to their
relationship to private social clubs. It will attempt to construct a
conceptual framework for determining whether legislative or judicial
interference with a particular activity, such as racial discrimination in
a private social club, violates the right to freedom of association as
applied by the courts. Finally, it will examine possible alternatives to
the legislation adopted by Maine for eliminating racial and religious
discrimination in certain types of private social clubs.
THE PRIVATE SOCIAL CLUB IN THE UNITED STATES
There are countless varieties of voluntary social associations in the
United States today. The propensity of Americans to form and join
these clubs has been noted by writers" and studied extensively by
sociologists.31 The great majority of these social clubs operate on a
upon the first amendment guarantee of freedom of religion. See Goshorn v. Bar Ass'n, 152 F.
Supp. 300, 306 (D.D.C. 1957).
29. See remarks of Hon. Win. M. McCulloch: "Moreover, where freedom of association
might logically come into play as in cases of private organizations, title II quite properly
exempts bona fide private clubs and other establishments." H.R. REP. No. 916, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 2, 9 (1963). This position is supported by commentary in the area. See, e.g., Note,
Public Accommodations Laws and the Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915, 918-19 (1966); Note,
The Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial Confusion, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1112, 1122 (1969); 45 N.C.L. REv. 498,500 (1967); 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 244,245.
46,250-51 (1967).
30. See, e.g., "The tendency of Americans to unite with their fellows for varied purposes-a
tendency noted a hundred years earlier by de Tocqueville-now became a general mania ....
It was a rare American who was not a member of four or five societies." C. & M. BEARD, 2
THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 730-31 (1929). "[N]othing could be more 'natural' to an
American than to join an association in the pursuit of interests shared by others. . . ." W.
WARNER, THm EMERGENT AMERICAN SocETY 276 (1967). See generally Schlesinger, Biography
of a Nation of Joiners, 50 AM. HIST. Rav. 1 (1944).
31. See, e.g., T. PARSONS, CONFLICTS OF POWER IN MODERN CuLTURE-A SYMPOSIuM 45
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very informal basis and exist only during some brief period in the lives
of their founding members. Some social clubs, however, tend to be
more permanent, lasting beyond the lifetimes of their founders and
members. Examples of the litter include national and local fraternal
and service organizations, country clubs, city clubs, and athletic
clubs. The history of these more permanent voluntary associations
coupled with available evidence concerning the extent of their racial
and religious discrimination provides the background for any
discussion of their alleged constitutional right to restrict membership
arbitrarily.
Country Clubs
Spurred by the development of highly industrialized urban centers
after the Civil War, wealthy Americans formed country clubs for
social and recreational purposes.3 2 The Country Club in Brookline,
Massachusetts, formed in 1882, is the oldest in this country, originally
providing a restaurant, bowling alley, tennis courts, horse racing
track, and social events for its members.3 Golfing facilities became
the central attraction of most country clubs, and with the increasing
popularity of golf the number of country clubs increased until there
were 4,500 in 1929.3
Financial pressures caused by the Depression, World War II, and
rising property taxes forced many clubs to close, their number
decreasing to a low of 2,800 in 1956.5 There are approximately 4,500
private country clubs in the United States today, and dues and guest
fees average over $500 per year.35 Financial pressures on the private
country club remain great, however, as evidenced by the increasing
membership dues, and admission of social members, and the en-
(L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein & R. Maciver 1947). Social scientists, for example, have concluded
that social status is usually positively associated with group membership. R. PRESTHUS, MEN AT
THE Top-A STUDY IN COMMUNITY POWER 246 (1964); W. WARNER, AMERICAN LIFE 229
(1962); see also W. WARNER, supra note 30, at 282-83 & n. 5.
32. Boyle, supra note 24, at 52. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY, 1878-
1898, at 288-90 (1933).
33. Boyle, supra note 24, at 52-53.
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id.
36. See Our Ailing Country Clubs, FORBES, March 15, 1971, at 43; Country Clubs Fall
Short of the Green. BusINEss WEEK, March 6, 1971, at 77.
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couragement of the use of club facilities by non-member organiza-
tions for meetings or banquets.37
The country club is extremely important to businessmen as the
scene of numerous informal business discussions, the source of new
business from fellow club members, and a place where a member may
entertain visiting business associates. For these reasons the ability to
belong to a club may control access to job promotion:18
It is important for our business that our plant managers maintain a certain
status in their communities. They must join the country club and the leading
city club. Today that's where the big deals are discussed and made. . . .They
must be able to maintain a free and easy association with the people who count.
If we promote Jewish personnel into key, sensitive positions, we run the risk of
social non-acceptability. We avoid this by picking someone else."
City Clubs
City clubs, first appearing in London, were originally coffee
houses where men gathered to learn the latest news, but later
developed into men's eating clubs." The Philadelphia Club, the first
city club in the United States, was informally formed in 1830. 1
Others soon followed in New York, Boston, San Francisco, and
Baltimore. Unlike the country club, the city club is built around its
eating facilities, and membership is often limited to one sex.
In a large city with more than one city club, membership in a
particular club may indicate a man's business position. For example,
membership in the Philadelphia Club has been described as "the final
criterion of Proper Philadelphia's acceptance of new men of power."12
37. -Id. at 53-54. See also note 36 supra. The author also indicates that financial pressures
have forced most country clubs to build facilities to attract the entire family. This magnifies the
racial or religious discrimination since it is forced on children through social association with
only those racial or religious elements their parents choose to admit to the club. See E. BALT-
ZELL, Tna PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND CASTE IN AMERICA 358 (1964).
38. Although most executives will claim publicly to rely solely on managerial capability in
promotion policies, see, e.g., Who Do You Promote? DuN's REvIEw AND MODERN INDUSTRY,
May, 1964, at 50, social considerations are also important. "[A]t the upper levels of the
administrative pyramid, when the opportunities for promotion are drastically reduced,
managerial capability loses some of its significance as a distinguishing element in selection."
Powell, Elements of Executive Promotion, CAL. MANAG. REV., Winter, 1963, at 85. Studies
indicate that membership in the right social club may be crucial to promotion. See Id. at 85-86,
88. See also Bowman, What Helps or Harms Promotability? HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1964,
at 6, 16-18. A recent article reports that 15-20 percent of private country club memberships
are subsidized by employers. FoRms, supra note 36, at 42.
39. Belth, Discrimination and the Power Structure, BARRIERS-A HUMAN RIGHTs READER
11(1958).
40. See E. BALTZELL, supra note 24, at 336-37.
41. Id. at 337.
42. Id. at 350.
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These city clubs may be more important than country clubs for
business and job promotion.4 Non-membership means not only loss
of contacts but, also the exclusion from daily business meetings held at
the clubs. One author reports that in Chicago a Jewish man next in
line for the presidency of a well-known firm was not selected because
he would not be able to lunch with the other executives at the men's
club."
The widespread racial and religious discrimination in private
social clubs is common knowledge.45 The extent of religious
discrimination among city and country clubs was the subject of a
nationwide study by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in
19626 covering 803 country clubs and 349 city clubs with a total
combined membership of 692,646. Some of the results of that study
are summarized on the chart below: 47
COUNTRY
CLUBS CITY CLUBS COMBINED
Total Member- Total Member- Total Member-
Clubs ship Clubs ship Clubs ship
TOTAL CLUBS 803 406,066 349 285,290 1152 692,646
DISCRIMINATORY
CLUBS 579 263,011 202 205,280 781 468,291
PERCENT 72% 60% 67%
NON-DISCRIMINATORY
CLUBS 224 143,655 147 80,700 371 224,355
PERCENT 28% 40% 33%
43. "[T]oday, and especially in the years since the end of the Second War, membership in one
or two of the leading men's clubs, which lie at the center of commercial power in most large
cities in the nation, has become a tacit prerequisite for promotion to the top positions in the
executive suites of our large national corporations." E. BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT
ESTABLISHMENT 362 (1964).
44. Id. at 367.
45. "The characteristically American lodges and secret societies . . . in the North very
rarely, if ever, include Negroes. This is also true of most social clubs, particularly and obviously
those that have to do with helping to maintain the status of the white elite." W. WARNER,
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN LIFE 22 (1952).
46. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, A STUDY OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BY SOCIAL CLUBS
(1962). Summaries of the results of this survey are reprinted in RIGHTS, Jan. 1962, at 83 and
Boyle, The Ways of Life at the Country Club-Part II. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 5, 1962,
at 71.
47. The clubs represented a national cross section chosen from those employing a
professional manager. Forty-six'states and the District of Columbia were represented. Neither
the study itself nor reports of its results mention how the survey determined whether a club
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Two-thirds of the clubs contacted discriminated on the basis of
religion. Of the discriminatory clubs 87 percent were Christian clubs
excluding or limiting Jews, while 13 percent were Jewish clubs
excluding or limiting Christians. More than 90 percent of the
discriminatory clubs practice their discrimination unofficially
without provision in their bylaws. The study further concluded that
such religious discrimination was not confined to a single geographic
area. Although the study, unique on a national level, dealt only with
religious discrimination, its results may also provide an indicator of
racial discrimination.4"
The Athletic Club
City athletic clubs, providing limited recreational rather than
dining facilities for their members, also follow restrictive membership
policies." A 1968 Anti-Defamation League study indicates that of 38
major athletic clubs in cities of over 100,000 only three had open
membership policies. Twenty-one allowed Jews but not blacks, while
14 barred both Jews and blacks or barred blacks while having a
Jewish quota.1
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: HISTORY AND ORIGIN
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
The most natural privilege of man next to the right of acting for himself, is that
of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in
common with them. The right of association therefore appears to be as almost
discriminated on the basis of religion. A club maintaining a quota was considered a
discriminatory club while a "non-discriminatory club" was one which "accepted Christians
and Jews without regard to religion in its membership policy and practice." RIGHTs, Jan. 1962,
at 84.
48. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 46, at 10. The results of a 1968 study of racial
and religious discrimination in city athletic clubs reveal that racial discrimination exceeds
religious discrimination in private athletic clubs. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
49. The New York Athletic Club has over the last five years been the center of considerable
controversy. The Anti-Defamation League reported in 1968 that the NYAC never had a black
member and had very few Jewish members, indicating a quota. In 1962 Hon. Robert F. Wagner,
then mayor of New York City, resigned from the club because of its discrimination. Collegiate
athletes from Villanova, Georgetown, City College of New York, and Manhattan College as
well as New York City high schools declined to participate in a NYAC sponsored track meet.
See RIirrs, June 1968, at 129.
- 50. The results of the study are reported at id. Racial and religious discrimination also exists
in other private social associations. For one report of discrimination in these other clubs see B.
EpSTIN & A. FORSTER, supra note 24, at 159-68 (college fraternities-the author indicates that'
such discrimination is declining because of university pressure).
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inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can
attack it without impairing the foundations of society.51
The right to freedom of association is not specifically mentioned in
the Constitution; 2 its boundaries must be gleaned from a series of
Supreme Court cases recognizing the right.e
Before 1958 several distinct "associational" rights were
recognized: the freedom to form, join, and support religious
associations; 4 the freedom of employees to associate together for
collective bargaining; 55 and the right to form and join political
51. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (Bradley ed. 1954).
52. There is very little in the way of constitutional history relating to the right to freedom of
association. In fact, some fear was expressed over the dangers of factionalism and insurrection
that might follow from the formation of groups. See THE FEDERAUST No. 9, at 124-30 (Wright
ed. 1961) (Q. Madison, A. Hamilton & J. Jay). De Tocqueville observed in his classic political
and social criticism of America that "[i]n no country in the world has the principle of
association been more successfully used or more unsparingly applied to a multitude of different
objects, than in America." 1 A. DE TOCQJEVILLE, supra note 51, at 197. For a more detailed
discussion of the constitutional background of freedom of association see C. RICE, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION 34-41 (1962) [hereinafter cited as RIcE]. See also C. ANTMAU, RIGHTS OF OUR
FATHERS 82-85 (1968).
53. In addition, the United Nations has recognized the right to freedom of association. "(1)
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be
compelled to belong to an association." Res. 217(11), Resolutions 71, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec.
3d Sess., Pt. I (A/810) (1948). UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS reprinted in 5 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (1965).
54. Religious associations were among the first established in America. The right to associate
voluntarily for religious purposes was basic to the aspirations of many of the original colonists
in settling in the New World. Gradually, however, religious freedom in all the colonies but
Rhode Island and Maryland was encumbered by laws encouraging the adopted religion of the
state and discouraging minority sects. See generally E. GREENE, RELIGION AND THE STATE
(1941). The process of separation of church and state began after the Revolution with the
adoption of the first amendment but was not completed until that amendment was .made
applicable to the states. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Governmental neutrality toward religious association is
firmly established, and the right of the individual to be free of unreasonable restraints in such
association is secure. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). The right to join and
support as well as the right not to join or support religious associations is absolute. The freedom
of religious association also includes the freedom to practice reasonable tenets of a religion.
Thus, a Jehovah's Witness might be excused from saluting the flag..West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Nevertheless, religious practices are subject to
reasonable restraint to protect public peace and order, especially where a religious opinion is
translated into an act or refusal to act. See generally Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429
F.2d 1064, 1072 (5th Cir., 1970); RIcE 48-72.
55. The history of the struggle of organized labor to overcome resistance to the formation of
unions and the principle of collective bargaining is well known. See generally M. ABERNATHY,
THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 180-90 (1961) [hereinafter cited as ABERNATHY];
D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 42-53 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
FELLMAN]. The right to freedom of association in labor unions was codified in the National
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parties." These rights arose either through legislation or as necessary
adjuncts to specific constitutional guarantees and to some extent
precluded governmental interference in these areas.
Member Disclosure
Formal recognition of a constitutional right to freedom of
association came in 1958 in NAACP v. AlabamaY Fined for
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449. "Employees shall have the right to
self organization to form, join or assist labor organizations to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other aid or protection." Id. § 7. The Labor-Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964) provides that workers are entitled to "full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing ....
56. The right of citizens to form, join, or support a political party is traceable from specific
constitutional guarantees of the freedoms of petition and speech and the right to vote. See
generally FELLMAN 36-52. Concerning the lack of express constitutional authority for political
parties, a California court replied:
No expression is needed in the declaration of rights to the effect that electors holding
certain political! principles in common may freely assemble, organize themselves into a
political party and use all legitimate means to carry their principles of government into
active operation through suffrages of their fellows. Such a right is fundamental. It is
inherent in the very form and substance of our government and needs no expression in its
constitution. Button v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. illS, 1117
(1900).
With the right to form, join, and support political parties firmly established, the cases have
involved state attempts to limit access to the ballot by both small and subversive parties. See
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). In one area the Court has intervened in the operation of
political parties. Whereas the right to form, join, and support a political party and the right of
the party to reasonable, non-discriminatory access to the ballot is constitutionally protected, the
party may not arbitrarily exclude black voters from a primary where the primary is an integral
step in the election process. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). In Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953), the exclusion restriction was extended to include a consistently successful
"private" political association, which conducted its own primary to determine its candidate in
the state sponsored primary. The association's candidate regularly won the state-wide primary.
57. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The constitutional right to freedom of association was referred to
several times prior to its formal enunciation in 1958. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 188 (1957); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 409 (1950); AFL v.
American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 546 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), the
Court said:
Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to
engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First
Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has
traditionally been through the media of political association. Id. at 250 (emphasis
added).
The Court overturned a contempt conviction arising from the refusal of the plaintiff to answer
questions raised by a state investigating committee concerning his political associations. It is
arguable that this only extended the existing right to form and join political parties.
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contempt after refusing to produce membership lists pursuant to a
foreign incorporation registration statute,s' the NAACP appealed,
claiming that such disclosure and accompanying pressure would
inhibit membership. It had been suggested that a constitutionally
protected right to freedom of association might be found in either the
first or fifth amendments. 59 The Court, noting that group action may
be essential to effective advocacy, overturned the contempt conviction
and recognized a constitutional right to freedom of association:
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "'liberty" assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to close scrutiny.8
The Court, with either the first or fifth amendments available for
support of this position, clearly chose to base its decision on the first
amendment. By relying on the illegal nature of the Klan's activities,
the Court distinguished an earlier case which upheld a New York anti-
Klan statute"' requiring any oath-bound organization to file a roster
of its members.62 Such inherent illegality could not be found in the
NAACP.
58. The impairment was an indirect, but none-too-subtle, attack on the right of the NAACP
to exist as a political pressure group. Attacks by southern states in particular upon the effective
existence of the NAACP were commonplace in the 1950's. See AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS,
ASSAULT UPON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, A STUDY OF THE SOUTHERN ATTACK ON THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (1957); McKay, With
All Deliberate Speed: Legislative Reaction and Judicial Development 1956-1957,43 VA. L. REv.
1205, 1235-42 (1957).
59. See Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure of Membership,
58 COLUM. L. REV. 614, 619-24 (1958). Professor Robison suggested that a constitutional right
to freedom of association could be predicated upon either the rights to free speech and press in
the first amendment or upon the "liberty" protected by the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, as a privilege "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." Id. at 621. He further noted that "[v]iewed solely as a first amendment requirement,
freedom of association must be regarded as ancilliary, rather than equal, to the rights explicitly
described by the amendment .... Associations would be vulnerable to state interference unless
they could show that their purpose, in part at least, was to exercise freedom of press, speech,
assembly or religion." Id. at 620-21.
60. 357 U.S. at 460-61 (emphasis added).
61. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). The statute can be found at N.Y. Sess. Laws
1923, ch. 664, as amended N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 54 (1968).
62. 357 U.S. 449,465 (1958). The Court said that it could takejudicial notice of the nature of
an organization's activities in'determining whether there is a substantial state interest in
disclosure of membership or other associational impairments. Compare Robison, supra note 59,
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Two different types of associational rights emerge from the case:
the right to belong anonymously to an unpopular political pressure
group with lawful aims and activities and, necessary for the effective
preservation of the first, the right of the association to assert the
associational rights of its members. The Court in dicta suggested that
the freedom of association included the right to advance beliefs and
ideas in economic, religious, or cultural, as well as political, matters.
The right to freedom of association as announced in NAACP v.
Alabama and developed in later cases appeared to be ancillary to
express first amendment freedoms. That is, a constitutional freedom
of association would be recognized only where the exercise of some
express first amendment right was impeded by the associational
restraint. In Bates v. City of Little Rock the secrecy of membership
lists was again held to be protected by the right to freedom of
association to advance ideas and air grievances.6 Justices Black and
Douglas concurred, indicating that "[the freedom of association] is
entitled to no less protection than any other first amendment right
. . ,. 4 Whether they too believed that the right was limited to
associations for the purpose of "advancing ideas and airing
grievances" is unclear since their opinion did not elaborate further on
the possible scope of the protection.
In Shelton v. Tucker" an Arkansas statute which required
teachers to disclose all organizational membership was held to violate
the freedom of association. Unlike NAACP v. Alabama and Bates,
where no legitimate state interest in the legislation had been found, the
state's legitimate interest in knowing certain organizational ties of its
teachers precipitated four dissents. Nevertheless, the majority held
that the required disclosure of all organizational ties constituted
unnecessary overbreadth leading to "constant and heavy"" pressures
on teachers to avoid controversial associations. In addition the less
restrictive alternative of more limited inquiry was available. Specu-
lation as to the extent of permissible inquiry may provide some indi-
cation of the scope of protected non-disclosure. The Court suggests
that a state might legitimately ask how many organizations a teacher
belongs to or how many hours that teacher spends in organizational
at 641-47, with Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1,
26 (1964) thereinafter cited as Emerson].
63. 361 U.S. 516,523 (1960).
64. Id. at 528.
65. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
66. Id. at 486.
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activity.67 But could a state ask all or even some of its teachers
whether they belonged to the NAACP? It probably could not,
especially where the NAACP is an unpopular or minority group and
disclosure is likely to lead to the impairment of associational rights.
On the other hand, could a state legitimately inquire whether a teacher
belonged to a local country club? The membership disclosure cases all
involve situations where disclosure may result in "reprisals against
and hostility to the members."" If this is a necessary element, then
anonymity is protected only where disclosure discourages association.
The relationship of freedom of association to express first
amendment rights remains unclear. In striking down a Louisiana
membership disclosure statute as unconstitutional, the Court noted
that "freedom of association is included in the bundle of First
Amendment rights ... ."" However, each of these early decisions
involved both an organization or members of organizations whose
activities were closely related to expressly protected freedoms of
speech, petition, press, and assembly and a real threat to the ability of
those organizations to exist without constitutional protection.
Association for Expression: Subversive Activities Cases
The freedom to associate for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
has been further refined in a series of "subversive activities" cases.
The Communist Party of the United States was found after
investigation to be a "Communist-action organization" and ordered
to register pursuant to section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950,70 which included a requirement that the organization
provide a list of its members. 71. When the Communist Party
challenged the statute, the Court held that this compulsory disclosure
67. Id. at488.
68. Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961).
69. Id. at 296. Apparently at least some members of the Supreme Court are still unsure
whether the right to freedom of association is entitled to independent status. "Whether the right
to associate is an independent First Amendment right carrying its own credentials and will be
carried beyond the implementation of other First Amendment rights awaits a definitive
answer." United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 283 n.1 (1967) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White relied on the Court's dismissal of a suit involving the right of a Florida accountant to
associate in his work with any nonresident accountant for failure to present a substantial federal
question. Id. See Mercer v. Hemmings, 389 U.S. 46 (1967), dismissing 194 So. 2d 579 (Fla.
1967).
70. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024 § 7(a), 64 Stat. 993(a), repealed 81
Stat. 766 (1968).
71. Id. § 7(d).
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of membership did not violate the first amendment,72 predicating its
finding of a sufficient state interest on a danger in anonymous
membership absent in the earlier membership disclosure cases. Justice
Douglas, although dissenting from the decision on other grounds,
found compulsory disclosure permissible because the association was
dominated by a foreign power and its activities amounted to more
than mere free speech.n That same day the Court upheld a conviction
under the membership clause of the Smith Act,7 finding in Scales v.
United States75 that a specific intent requirement protected against
any unlawful impediment to associational interests. It thus appears
that the right to freedom of association is limited by both the nature
of the organization's activities and the reasonableness of the
restriction sought to be imposed.
Irrespective of subversive activity charges, broad protection is
provided the legitimate political objectives of organizations. Thus, a
Florida legislative investigating committee could not require an
NAACP official to confirm whether persons suspected of being
Communists belonged to the NAACP.7' The Court suggested that in
the absence of any 'showing of danger to the community inherent in
the organization itself the right to anonymous organizational
membership was indispensible to the right to freedom of association,
"particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." Once again,
however, the Court was careful to limit its rationale for the need for
72. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
73. Id. at 172-74. Justice Douglas apparently believed that because the activities of the
Communist Party in the United States involved more than what was expressly protected by the
first amendment, their associational interests were subject to greater lawful impairment.
74. Smith Act, ch. 645, § 2385, 62 Stat. 808 (1948), as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
The membership clause provided for a fine of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not
more than 20 years or both for "[w]hoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any
society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or
affiliates with, any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof
75. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The trial court judge correctly instructed the jury that guilt could
only be predicated upon a "present 'advocacy of [illegal] action'" as soon as circumstance3
permit and active membership including both knowledge of and support for the organization's
illegal objectives. Id. at 220.
76. Gibson v. Florida Legis. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). The Court held that
because disclosure would represent a substantial abridgement of associational freedom the state
could require disclosure of organizational membership only where there is some observable
nexus between the organization and Communist activity.
77. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
1196 [Vol. 1970:1181
Vol. 1970:1181] PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINA TION
associational protection to organizations engaged in other first
amendment activity: "Compelling such an organization engaged in
the exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to disclose its
membership presents, under our cases, a question wholly different
from compelling the Communist Party to disclose its own
membership. ' 7
In Elfbrandt v. Russel 7 9 an Arizona loyalty oath statute80
providing both perjury prosecution and dismissal from public office
for any state employee who willfully became or remained a member of
the Communist Party was held to violate the first amendment. The
Court recognized that an organization may have both legal and illegal
goals and that any blanket prohibition would invade "legitimate
political . . . association" by punishing an individual for knowing
but guiltless behavior."' The court did not save the statute by reading
into it the specific requirements of active membership and illegal
intent as in Scales.
In 1967 the Supreme Court found that the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950 denied protected associational rights by its
overbroad prohibition against any member of any "Communist-
action organization" engaging in any defense facility employment.
s2
The Court again was unable to read "active membership and specific
intent" into the statute s3 Other blanket disabilities applied to mere
membership in subversive organizations have met the same fate in
lower federal courts.u
The "subversive activities" cases do not extend the freedom of
association beyond protection of the right to advance ideas and air
grievances collectively. As such, the freedom appears ancillary to
protected first amendment activity.8s In Scales and Eljbrandt the
Court recognized the co-existence of legal and illegal aims possible,
because for any particular member the organization may be a
78. Id. at 549.
79. 384 U.S. I I (1966).
80. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-231 (Supp. 1970).
81. 384 U.S. at 16.
82. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
83. Id. at 265-66.
84. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964) (law making it unlawful
for a Communist Party member to hold office in a labor union); Reed v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp.
87 (C.D. Calif. 1966) (law denying health care benefits to those required to register under the
Internal Security Act of 1950).
85. See note 69 supra.
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"vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims. . ."m These cases
suggest the scope of the right as applied to political or other similar
organizations. Federal or state laws attaching disabilities to mere
membership in organizations exercising first amendment rights are
probably absolutely invalid where the governmental interest can be
satisfied by a narrower statute pro'scribing, for example, active
membership and specific intent.8 7 A narrowly drawn statute
restricting either anonymous membership or the unencumbered
freedom to form or join must be supported by a compelling
governmental interest.
Even if the foregoing cases can be extended to afford protection to
social organizations not exercising express first amendment rights,
that protection is still limited by the requirements that the activities
and goals of the group be at least partially legal and the legislative
attack pose a serious threat to some associational interest.
Freedom to Associate and Protected Group Activity
The right to freedom of association was extended during the mid-
1960's not only to prevent legislative restrictions on membership but
also to protect certain associational activities closely related to
express first amendment freedoms. In an attempt to curb the
NAACP's legal attack on racial barriers, Virginia enacted a statute
prohibiting acceptance of employment or compensation by an
attorney from any person who was not a party to, or had no pecuniary
right or liability in, a judicial proceeding. 8' The statute further
prohibited soliciting of legal business by an organization for an
attorney. The NAACP had retained a legal staff and encouraged
private lawsuits which it financed when an NAACP lawyer was used
by the litigant. Virginia's highest court, in a suit for declaratory relief,
held that the soliciting, encouraging, and financing of litigation were
86. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961). See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11, 15 (1966).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
88. See, e.g.,'367 U.S. at 229. There is some question, especially with respect to contentious
organizations whose activities and goals are legal, whether any statute which chills the freedom
to join or organize would be constitutionally permissible. See Gibson v. Florida Legis. Invest.
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 562-65 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). "[l]t is clear that any restraint
upon the mere forming or joining an organization for purposes of expression must be held in
conflict with the first amendment." Emerson 23.
89. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 78, 79 (1950), as amended, Acts of 1956 Ex. Sess., ch. 33, as
amended, Acts of 1964, Va. Sess. Laws, ch. 201, 622.
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prohibited by the statute.90 Noting that litigation to the NAACP was
more than a "technique of resolving private differences" and was
actually "a form of political expression," the Supreme Court
reversed in NAACP v. Button.91 Recognizing that for organizations
such as the NAACP "association for litigation may be the most
effective form of political association,"'9 2 the Court held that the
statute, as applied, violated rights of association and was unjustified
by any sufficient state interest in the regulation of the legal profession.
A narrow reading of Button would have limited its holding to
cases where litigation was found to be the equivalent of political
expression for the association. However, a year later, in Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,93 the Court held invalid a Virginia
court decree relating to legal solicitation by a labor union and
promotion of the legal actions of its members. Whenever a workman
was injured or killed and a potential claim arose under either the
Safety Appliance Act 94 or the Federal Employer's Liability Act,9s the
union would advise the worker or his family not to settle without
seeing a local attorney recommended by the union. This practice
resulted in channeling substantially all the labor injury claims work to
the recommended attorneys. The Court held that the first amendment
protected the workers' right to combine to assert most effectively their
statutory rights. Specifically relying on Button, the Court proclaimed
that "the Constitution protects the associational rights of the
members of the Union precisely as it does those of the NAACP."' '
Nowhere in the decision was litigation equated with political
expression. Therefore, at the very least, the case extended the freedom
of association beyond association for political expression. Although
the right to associate to bargain collectively had been established by
statute,97 the Trainmen case extended the constitutional freedom of
association for the first time to an economic, as opposed to a political,
association. Despite the fact that the decision was based upon the
90. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960). rev'd, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
91. 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). The Court remarked that "there is no longer any doubt that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. Thus we have
affirmed the right to 'engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.'" Id. at
430 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 43 1.
93. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
94. 27 Stat. 531, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1957).
95. 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
96. 377 U.S. at 8.
97. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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implied first amendment right to freedom of association, the Court
noted that express first amendment rights protect the right of a group
to assist its members to litigate effectively:
It cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment's guarantees of free
speech, petition and assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together
for the lawful purpose of helping and advising one another . . . .The right
...to consult with each other. . . includes the right to select a spokesman
...to give the wisest counsel."
To add more traditional first amendment doctrine to the decision, the
Court reasoned that to deny the right of union members to "advise
and assist" one another in litigation would unduly burden the right to
petition the courts." In a subsequent case, the "advice and
assistance" that could be given by a union to its members was
extended to direct employment of an attorney by the union to
represent any member in the prosecution of a workmen's
compensation claim before a state industrial commission.'" The
Court found Button and Trainmen controlling, stating that the result
in Button was not based on the presence of a political question.' 0'
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT
Conceptual Model
In constructing any conceptual framework to determine which
activities are protected by the constitutional right to freedom of
association, the context in which an associational right is asserted is
of vital importance. The preceding cases suggested several bases of
contextual classification: (1) Legality of the organization's activities
and goals-the organization might be one whose goals and activities
are completely legal, such as the NAACP;19e one whose goals and
activities are partially legal, such as the Communist Party;'1 or one
98. 377 U.S. at 5-6.
99. Id. at 7.
100. UMW Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
101. Id. at 223. Justice Clark suggested in his dissent in Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 10, that the
absence of the equivalent of political expression there removed the first amendment protection
from the associational activity. Even though the Court in United Mine Workers denied the need
for political expression, the opinion noted that "[t]he grievances for redress of which the right of
petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones."
389 U.S. at 223. The decision rested upon the full effectuation of express first amendment rights.
102. See, e.g., 377 U.S. at 5 ("lawful purpose"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958) ("lawful association").
103. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15 (1966); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 229 (1961).
1200 [Vol. 1970:1181
Vol. 1970:1181] PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
whose goals and activities are completely illegal, such as a criminal
gang intent upon robbing a bank. 104 (2) Type of organization-
political, economic, social, cultural, or religious. 05 (3) Type of
restriction imposed-the restriction might inhibit the joining or
forming of the organization'" or the conduct of group activity; 0 7
produce forced association;108  or prohibit some form of
discrimination.' 9 (4) Conduct restricted by the regulation-is the
conduct likely to be effected by the restriction expressly protected by
the first amendment?110
Case law and the Model
Using this model we might draw several conclusions from the
preceding cases. For example, where the goals and activities of a
political organization are completely legal, the organization may
successfully assert the right to free association against a restriction
which threatens the effective existence of the association by inhibiting
joining or forming."' Applying the model to a private social club and
104. See generally Emerson 6.
105. Political, economic, cultural, and religious organizations which were seeking to advance
beliefs were specifically mentioned in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). The
social organization was first mentioned in the modern freedom of association cases in Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See note 116 infra and accompanying text. Justice Douglas,
writing the opinion of the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), stated that the
Court had protected association pertaining to the social benefit of members. Id. at 483. See note
114 Infra and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479,486 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,459 (1958).
107. See notes 89-101 supra and accompanying text.
108. See generally Emerson 15-19. Three cases in particular have been discussed in terms of
forced association. In Railway Employers Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), the Supreme
Court upheld a provision in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964), which permitted
railroad unions to negotiate union shop contracts. The challenge to the law was based in part
upon the right to freedom of association. The Court, however, did not discuss the constitutional
issue but rather held that all employees could be required to contribute to the costs of collective
bargaining. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), the Court
upheld the same provision of the Railway Labor Act against the objection that union dues were
being used to support political causes contrary to the beliefs of some union members. The
constitutional issue was avoided again by a holding that the Act did not authorize such political
spending. In Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), a state law was upheld which required
all lawyers in the state to become members of the State Bar of Wisconsin.
109. In a philosophical sense there are anti-associational aspects to both the unfettered
practice of racial and religious discrimination and governmental intervention by statute or court
decision to discourage such discrimination. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1.34 (1959).
110. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
I 11. This represents a conceptual model of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See
notes 57-62 supra and accompanying text.
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a state license law which prohibits racial and religious discrimination
by the licensee, the question might be phrased differently: Where the
goals and activities of a social organization are completely legal, may
the association, which is not engaged in protected first amendment
activity successfullly assert the right to free association against a
restriction which discourages racial and religious discrimination in
the selection of its members? This statement of the issue raises the
following questions not resolved by the freedom of association cases
already discussed: Can the right be asserted by a social club? Can it be
asserted by a social club that can show no relationship between the
express protections of the first amendment and its activities? If so, can
it be asserted by such a social club to protect racial and religious
discrimination? Since none of these questions has been squarely
decided regarding the adult social club, the evidence supporting the
extension of freedom of association to non-contentious social clubs
and their choice to discriminate in withholding either membership or
facilities on the basis of race or religion must be carefully analyzed.
Freedom of Association and Discrimination in the Social Club
Association-Expression Equation. Dicta in Griswold v.
Connecticut12 imply that the right to freedom of association might be
extended beyond its first amendment roots in the appropriate case.
Operators of a Planned Parenthood League Center, which dispensed
birth control information and medical advice to married couples, had
been convicted for violating a state statute prohibiting giving such
advice and counsel. After finding that the operators had standing to
raise the constitutional rights of their advisees, the Supreme Court
held the statute an unconstitutional violation of the right of privacy,
an implied constitutional guarantee.1 3 Justice Douglas in the majority
opinion spoke of another peripheral constitutional guarantee, the
right to freedom of association: "[W]e have protected forms of
'association' that are not political in the customary sense but pertain
to the social, legal and economic benefit of the members."" 4
Although Justice Douglas cited NAACP v. Button"' for this
principle, this extension of associational protection to social aspects
112. 381 U.S.47 (1965).
113. "Mhe First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion." Id. at 483. See notes 147-52 infra and accompanying text.
114. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
115. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See notes 89-92 supra and accompanying text.
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of membership was unsupported by anything in that case. In fact, the
only reference to social associations in any freedom of association
case prior to this was in Shelton v. Tucker where the Court noted that
the overly broad statute would require disclosure of every conceivable
"associational tie-social, professional, political, avocational or
religious."'16
Justice Douglas in Griswold seemingly equated joining any
organization with expression:
The right of "association" . . . is more than the right to attend a meeting; it
includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a
group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means. Association in that
context is a form of expression of opinion, and while it is not expressly included
in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express
guarantees fully meaningful."'
It might be argued that membership in any organization is an
expression of approval for whatever that group does, providing a
somewhat tenuous first amendment connection for discriminatory
policies of a private social club.' But joining a non-first amendment
exercising association seems closer to action than expression.110
However, if the organization were engaged in communication such as
advocating racial separation, 120 the act of joining might be so closely
116, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
117. 381 U.S. at 483 (dicta).
118. "In one way or another each of [the many thousands of voluntary associations] is
actually or potentially a pressure group." RicE 110.
119. The principle advocate of the "expression"-"action" distinction is Professor
Emerson. T. EzERsoN, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AIMENDMENT 115 (1966).
This distinction becomes significant in determining the standard by which any restriction is to be
judged. If the act is one of pure expression, it assumes a preferred position. See Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). See generally Robison, supra note 59, at 622-23.
120. See, e.g., In re Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 9
N.Y.2d 376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961).
The Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, a group advocating individual
choice in matters of interracial association, applied to incorporate in New York under section 10
of the Membership Corporations Law. Act of March 2, 1916, ch. 19, § 1, [1916] N.Y. Laws 39
(now N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFrr CORP. LAW § 404 (1970)). That law provided that each certificate
of incorporation required the approval of the local justice of the state supreme court. The judge
interpreted his function to include an inquiry into whether the purposes and policies of the
applicant were in accord with public policy and refused to grant the charter. 17 Misc. 2d 1012,
1013, 187 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (Sup. Ct.), affd on rehearing, 18 Misc. 2d 534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885
(Sup. Ct.), application denied, 10 App. Div. 2d 604, 199 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1959), appeal denied, 10
App. Div. 2d 711, 199 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dept.), petition to revoke opinions denied, 10 App. Div.
2d 873, 202 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dept.), motion to clarify order and decision of April 18, 1960
denied, I 1 App. Div. 2d 713, 205 N.Y.S.2d 878 (2d Dept.), motion for consolidation of appeals
denied, 8 N.Y.2d 910, 168 N.E.2d 826, 204 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1960). That interpretation of the
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associated with the group communication as to be protected by the
first amendment.' 2 1
Fraternity, Sorority, and Non-School Club Cases. That there is
first amendment protection for the right to form, join, and
discriminate in private social clubs has been argued in a line of
fraternity and sorority cases, but none'of these cases which discuss the
right to freedom of association has reached the Supreme Court or
satisfactorily answered whether the freedom of association protects
the right of the adult private social club to discriminate on the basis of
race or religion. In Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the University
of Colorado,"2 the most notable of the fraternity cases since it was
decided after 1958"2 and discussed the application of the enunciated
constitutional right to freedom of association to social organizatons,
the university had resolved to place on probation any organization
"compelled by its constitution, rituals, or government to deny
membership to any person because of his race, color, or religion."'2 4
Pursuant to this resolution the university placed the local Sigma Chi
chapter on probation with loss of rushing and pledging privileges.1lu
statute was criticized on first amendment grounds. See Vance, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Choice in New York State, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 290 (1961). See also McAulay &
Brewster, In Re Application of the Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, 6
How. L.J. 169 (1960). The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, noting that "[d]issenting
organizations have equal rights, "so far as freedom of expression is concerned, as any other
groups, and are entitled to an equal and objective application of the statute." 9'N.Y.2d at 383,
174 N.E.2d at 490,214 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
121. Where the act of joining is not so closely related to any communication that it might be
termed expression, it becomes "action" and is subject to greater restriction. See generally
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1039 (1969). In addressing
himself to Justice Douglas' association-expression equation, Professor Emerson observed:
Joining or belonging to an organization engaged in "expression" should be classified as
"expression." But joining or belonging to an organization engaged in "action" cannot
be considered a "method of expression," and the associational rights there involved
would be governed by constitutional doctrines concerned with governmental powers over
"action." Emerson 27.
122. 285 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966). See Comment, State Universities and the
Discriminatory Fraternity: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 169, 189 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Discriminatory Fraternity]; 45 N.C.L. REV. 1033 (1966); 39 U. COLO. L.
REV. 149 (1966).
123. A considerable number of cases decided prior to the enunciation of the freedom of
association in NAACP v. Alabama in 1958 held that a state might legitimately ban or control
social fraternities in high schools and colleges. See, e.g., Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S.
589 (1915); Webb v. State Univ., 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 867
(1954); Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), affd, 323 U.S.
685 (1945). See generally Discriminatory Fraternity 185.
124. 258 F. Supp. at 519 (Resolution of the University of Colorado, March I!, 1956).
125. Beta Nu Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity, a social fraternity at the university, filed a
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The fraternity challenged the resolution, claiming that it interfered
with the constitutionally protected right to freedom of association.
The three-judge federal court, s examining nearly every case since
1958 invoking the freedom of association, concluded that "[iut can
not be said that any of the . . . decisions uphold the right of
association as applied to a social fraternity."1  The court refused to
decide the issue independently, however, but reasoned instead that
even if there were constitutional protection for the right of any social
association to select members free of state regulation, such a right was
not unqualified.ss Therefore, since the state through its Board of
Regents had a substantial interest and broad discretion in promoting
education and maintaining educational discipline and since the
specific objective sought to be advanced-the freedom from
compulsory discrimination-was legitimate, the method used to
achieve this objective was a reasonable restraint upon any first
amendment rights which might exist to protect a social fraternity.
Sigma Chi's applicability to private social clubs outside the
university milieu was questionable because of the unique relationship
that existed between students and a university.' 2  The increased
recognition in recent years, however, of the applicability of
constitutional guarantees to both the college and high school student
diminishes the present significance of any distinction between a
university social fraternity and a private social club.1 0 If Sigma Chi is
"certificate of compliance" as required by the resolution even though its national organiation
had already suspended their Stanford chapter after it had pledged a black student. The
university doubts concerning the genuineness of the chapter pledge were increased by a
requirement which forbade a Sigma Chi chapter to propose for membership anyone "likely to
be considered personally unacceptable as a brother by any chapter or any brother anywhere."
Id. at 518. The Beta Nu chapter attempted unsuccessfully to show that the Stanford suspension
was not the result of pledging a black student and that in any event the Colorado chapter had
complete autonomy. The university was not convinced.
126. The three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
127. 258 F. Supp. at 526.
128. "[W]e hold that if the right [of association] exists it is a relative one. Thus the plaintiffs
can not insist on immunity from state regulation." Id. at 527.
129. The Sigma Chi case, of course, involved a restriction imposed by the state upon a state
university. Since the case established that such a restriction is not constitutionally impermissible
and not that the state was required to prohibit discrimination because of possible implications of
state action inherent in the existence of a discriminatory fraternity on a state campus, the
decision seems equally applicable to the case of a private university which imposes a similar
restriction.
130. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See
generally Wright, supra note 121, at 1027; Project, Procedural Due Process and Campus
Disorder: A Comparison of Law and Practice, 1970 DuKE L.J. 763.
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still valid, adult social clubs could be dealt with in the same manner
by the state as the college social fraternity was by the university.
In a similar case' the Sacramento, California, school district's
governing board had outlawed non-school clubs which perpetuated
their membership by decision of their members. The state appellate
court upheld the regulation against a constitutional freedom of
association attack. The regulation involved was much more drastic
than that in Sigma Chi in that it denied the right of the organization
to exist. This deference to the expertise of the school administrators
undoubtedly resulted from the age of the complaining students and
their relationship to school officials."' The court in dicta suggested
that first amendment protection might exist for discriminatory
policies of adult social organizations:
The right of adults freely to join together socially and to assemble for lawful
purpose may be conceded to include the right to. . . maintain clubs, secret or
nonsecret, the right to be as snobbish as they choose, and any attempt at
interference with that right by legislative or administrative mandate may well
be said to be arbitrary, unreasonable and therefore in violation of the First
Amendment.1'3
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
The constitutional right to form, join, support, and discriminate in
an adult social club has not been squarely faced. Assuming that the
right to freedom of association is general and includes the right to
form and join a private social club,'3 the vital question remains
131. Robison v. Sacramento Unified School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d 278, 53 Cal. Rptr. 781
(1966). See Note, First Amendment Right of Association for High School Student, 55 CAL. L.
REv. 911 (1967).
132. 245 Cal. App. 2d at 291, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
133. Id. at 291, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
134. Although application of freedom of association cases to the private social club was
attempted in the Sigma Chi case, the court found that they did not directly support a right to
form and join a private social club. See note 127 supra and accompanying text. See also 55 CAL.
L. REV., supra note 131, at 918 n.5.
Some commentators have argued that the freedom of association has no applicability to
private social clubs, maintaining that it was meant to assure only the full effectuation of express
first amendment rights. See, e.g., Discriminatory Fraternity 187; Note, Freedom ofAssoclation:
ConstitutionalRight or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L. REV. 730, 752 (1960); cf. Wright, supra
note 121, at 1058. Thus, where an organization can point to no protected first amendment
purpose the right to freedom of association is inapplicable. This view seems consistent with those
freedom of association cases relying on the presence of expressly protected first amendment
rights. See text accompanying notes 51-111 supra.
This position, however, conflictii with other opinions which support a general constitutional
right to form, join, and support any organization whose goals and activities are legal. See, e.g.,
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whether the right to exclude or deny services based on race or religion
is included in the club's protected associational rights. The immediate
concern is not whether there is support for an individual's demand
that a club not discriminate on the basis of race or religion.' m
Dicta suggests that the affirmative right to form and join should
be supplemented with a right to discriminate arbitrarily in a social
context by excluding unwanted members. In the course of limiting the
Court's holding in Evans v. Newton,13' which declared that a park
operated by the city as testamentary trustee could not be turned back
to private trustees for the purpose of continuing racial discrimination,
Justice Douglas wrote that "[a] private golf club, however, restricted
to either Negro or white membership is one expression of freedom of
association."' 1 Two years earlier Justice Goldberg in distinguishing
restaurants from "private places"' 3' commented that:
[p]rejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional
Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1367 (1963). Cf. Emerson 6, who
suggests that any determination that the right to form and join is absolute is really not very
helpful in solving "associational" problems. The argument is made that the right to join and
form legitimate political pressure groups logically includes the right to join and form less
contentious groups. See Rice, The Constitutional Right of Association, 16 HASTINGs L.J. 491,
500 (1965). This freedom is an affirmative right to form or join a social club, regardless of
whether the club can show some connection with express first amendment rights. It does not
answer the third question-whether the social club has the constitutional right to discriminate
on the basis of race or religion; or more specifically whether discrimination, like litigation and
unlike armed robbery, is constitutionally protected associational activity.
135. This distinction is illustrated by a comparison of two Supreme Court decisions.
In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Supreme Court faced an attempt to avoid earlier
court decisions which guaranteed the right to vote in political party primaries. The Jaybird
Democratic Association, formed in a Texas county, conducted a primary for its all-white
membership early in the election year. The successful candidate then entered the official
democratic primary in which all registered Democrats in the county could vote. For 60 years
the endorsed Jaybird candidates had won the Democratic primaries. The scheme, with seem-
ingly little active state cooperation, effectively disenfranchised the Negro voter. Upon com-
plaint by a frustrated voter, the Court held that the party's racial discrimination violated the
fifteenth amendment. This holding is the equivalent of a constitutional right to membership in a
political association which plays a significant role in state election processes. The right to de-
mand that a club not discriminate under existing law is discussed in text accompanying notes
198-203 infra.
The fundamental issue as to whether there is constitutional protection for the right of an
organization to discriminate in selecting its members was faced in Railroad Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,
326 U.S. 88 (1945). The New York Civil Rights Law prohibited labor organizations from
denying membership or services based upon race. color, or creed. The union involved, a
voluntary association of mail clerks, challenged the law as a violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. A unanimous Court upheld the legislation, deciding that there was
no constitutional protection for the union's discrimination. Our inquiry here is more like that of
the court in the latter case.
136. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
137. Id. at 299.
138. Bellv. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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right of every person to close his home or club to any person or to choose his
social intimates and business partners solely on the bases of personal prejudice
including race.'
An analysis of this alleged right to exclude raises perplexing
associational questions. As opposed to the right to form and join, it is
a negative right-a right to prevent others from joining. The rationale
for such a negative right is an unwillingness to force social intercourse
upon an unwilling member.4 0 However, arbitrary exclusion from a
private social club based upon race or religion limits the class of those
with whom the excluded may freely associate,' particularly if the
excluded happens to be a member of a minority too small to support a
private facility. Therefore, it is unclear whether constitutionally
protected exclusion would expand or diminish the quantum of
freedom in associational relationships. It is difficult, for example, to
determine whether our society enjoyed greater freedom to associate
before or after discrimination was banned in public schools and
public accommodations.
Threats from anti-discrimination legislation to the existence or
effectiveness of a particular association present a different question.4 2
This is particularly true in the case of a religious organization where
homogenity with respect to religion might be essential. The very
existence of a small political party might depend upon its ability to
139. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). See also Wesley v. City of Savannah, 294 F. Supp, 698, 701
(S.D. Ga. 1969).
140. See. e.g., Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 99 A. 134 (1916).
This same argument was adopted by the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896):
"The argument [that enforced separation of the races stamps the "colored race" with a
-badge of inferiority] also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation,
and that equal rights cannot be secured to the Negro except by enforced commingling of
the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms
of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals. Id. at 55 1.
141. See generally Discriminary Fraternities 188. Of course, in this latter case the restriction
on the freedom to associate is imposed by a private group as opposed to the state. Private
discrimination has increasingly become the legitimate concern of government, however, as
evidenced in recent civil rights laws and court decisions. See note I supra.
142. Where compulsory membership would destroy the organization from within there would
be a greater danger of sensitizing the right to form and join. See Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479,
2 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1938) wherein the court, with respect to a labor union, noted that
if the union which was a voluntary association organized for the good of those taken into
membership and for those in industry who would be eligible to membership could be
compelled to accept members, the persons whose interests were inimical to the union and
its purposes could force themselves into membership in the union and from within
destroy the union and thus stultify the purposes for which the union was organized. Id. at
480-81, 2 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
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exclude its adversaries. It is doubtful, however, whether the existence
of the private social club would be threatened by properly drawn anti-
discrimination laws.143
Questions of the right of the private social club to discriminate on
the basis of race or religion cannot be resolved in terms of a first
amendment right to freedom of association. The cases since 1958 in
this area relying on the right to freedom of association do not
confront the issue of exclusion, much less the extent to which the
personal prejudices of associational members are constitutionally
protected by the first amendment. It is difficult to find any connection
between the expressly protected first amendment rights and the
activities of the private social club. Mr. Justice Douglas' equating of
association and expression in Griswold"' might be taken to indicate
that the right to join a segregated country club and keep it that way is
a form of protected expression. However, a closer nexus between the
threatened associational activity and express first amendment rights
has always been found where the right to freedom of association has
been successfully invoked.'*
Limitations upon the right of a state to regulate the membership
practices of private social clubs are probably imposed, if at all, from
considerations outside the right to freedom of association as it has
developed in the cases since 1958.146
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Although the right to privacy like the right to freedom of
association is not mentioned specifically in the Constitution, a general
constitutional right to privacy was recognized in Griswold."47 That the
143. See note 196 infra and accompanying text.
144. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 63, 78, 91, 98, 99 supra.
146. Professor Emerson noted that:
Associational rights, to the extent they exist, are not derived solely from the first
amendment. Rather they are implied in the whole constitutional framework for the
protection of individual liberty in a democratic society. Emerson 5.
This is a position very similar to the alternative ground suggested for the decision in NAA CP v.
Alabama. See Robison, supra note 59. Professor Emerson suggests:
The right of the government to compel personal associations, as by forbidding racial
discrimination in schools, housing, public facilities, clubs and the like however, is surely
not subject to resolution in terms of a blanket right of association or non-association.
Rather such problems . . . must be framed in terms of drawing the line between the
public and private sectors of our common life. The question is, in short, one of the right
of privacy. . . . Emerson 20:
147. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Justices strained to find a constitutional basis for this right of privacy
is indicated by the scope of the four concurring opinions."' Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, found that a right to privacy could be
implied from the penumbra of several of the first eight amendments."'
Citing the right to freedom of association as one example, he
explained that there emanates from ihe first eight amendments not
only express protections but other implied protections which "give
[the express guarantees] life and substance."'I-
Whether the opinion of the Court in Griswold based this right to
privacy on the associational rights of the married couple who chose to
use contraceptive devices is unclear. 5 ' Nevertheless, a majority of the
Court agreed that somewhere in the Constitution is a right of privacy
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. This right
to privacy, especially in the sense used by Justice Goldberg in his
concurring opinion, is not the right to anonymity granted to NAACP
members in NAACP v. Alabama,5 2 but rather the right to an
unregulated sphere of lawful activity153 A broad right to privacy
based upon notions of a limited government adds a new dimension to
associational preferences. That is, there may exist a right to
associational privacy which protects not only associational
anonymity'" but also the right of an individual in certain situations to
associate or refuse to associate with another for any arbitrary reason.
The theory is that at some point governmental control of an
148. In addition to Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court, the concurring opinion of Justice
Goldberg found a right to privacy to be among those unenumerated but nevertheless
fundamental rights contemplated by the ninth amendment, Id. at 486. Justices Harlan and
White also wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 499 & 502. Justice Harlan felt there was no
need to find a right to privacy in the Bill of Rights in order for the Court to invalidate the
legislation as an unwarranted state interference with fundamental values "implicit in the scheme
of ordered liberty." Id. at 500. Justice White pursued a "reasonable" due process inquiry
finding that the statute was not necessary or rationally connected to its avowed objective. Id. at
505-06. For a more detailed analysis of the several opinions see Note, Supreme Court finds
Marital Privacy Immunized from State Intrusion as a Bill of Rights Periphery, 1966 DuKE L.J.
562. See generally Symposium, Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
149. 381 U.S. at 483.
150. Id. at 484.
151. "[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony In
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." Id. at 486. See also
Kauper, Penumbras. Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. RaV. 235, 256 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kauper].
152. See notes 57-62 supra and accompanying text.
153. 381 U.S. at 486, 495-97.
154. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
1210 [Vol. 1970:1181
Vol. 1970:1181] PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
individual's lawful preferences and actions must cease. 155
Consequently, in order to conclude that there is no constitutional
protection for the choice of a private social club to withhold
membership or services based upon race or religion, it is not enough
to determine merely that the first amendment right to freedom of
association does not apply. The inquiry must include whether and to
what extent the right to privacy protects the associational preferences
of the private social club.
In fact, the right of privacy is a more sensible concept to use in
attempting to measure the limits of protected racial and religious
discrimination than the right to freedom of association. A privacy
concept seems more amenable to the differentiation necessary to
distinguish a four couple bridge club from a multi-functional
suburban golf, swimming, and tennis club. Even if there is a right to
associational privacy which protects some sphere of individual
associational preferences,"' there is no right to absolute associational
preference once a person chooses to step beyond such a private
sphere. 5 7 The problem is to determine where that sphere ends and
whether particular legiplation invades it.
DELIMITING THE PRIVATE SPHERE
The novelty of a right to privacy, insofar as it refers to the right to
a sphere of unregulated human activity, explains the absence of
155. For a brief discussion of this approach see Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219 (1965). "In modem terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
state." Id. at 229.
156. See. e.g., Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L.
REv. 979, 989-90.
157. This thesis was expressed as early as 1890. See Ferguson v. Giles, 82 Mich. 358, 46
N.W. 718 (1890). The court there noted:
The man who goes either by himself or with his family to a public place must expect to
meet and mingle with all classes of people. He cannot ask, to suit his caprice or prejudice
or social views, that this or that man shall be excluded because he does not wish to
associate with them. He may draw his social line as closely as he chooses at home, or in
other private places, but he cannot in a public place carry the privacy of his home with
him or ask that people not as good or as great as he is shall step aside when he appears.
All citizens who conform to the law have the same rights in such places, without regard to
race, color, or condition of birth or wealth. The enforcement of the principles of the
Michigan civil rights act of 1885 interferes with the social rights of no man, but it clearly
emphasizes the legal rights of all men in public places. Id. at 367-68,46 N.W. at 721.
See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,775 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). "Some forced associations are inevitable in an industrial society. One who of
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precise tests for its future application.ls In Griswold Justice Douglas
found the Connecticut statute overbroad in its intrusion upon a
fundamental right."' Justice Goldberg, after finding that the state
statute impaired a fundamental right-the right to privacy in the
marriage relationship-opted for a balancing test, placing a heavy
burden of justification upon the state. t Justice White noted the need
for "substantial justification" before the state enters the realm of
family life.'" This balancing process as applied to private social clubs
contemplates at least two distinct inquiries. First, the state must show
that it has a compelling and legitimate interest in proscribing
discrimination in social associations. Second, the character and
strength of the right to privacy asserted by the club must be measured
in some way. It is fair to say that the strength of the privacy interest
will depend to some extent upon the type of social associational
relationship involved and to some extent upon the conduct regulated
within that relationship. For example, the marriage relationship is
entitled to greater privacy protection than the relationship of two
people sitting next to one another on a bus." 2 Within the marriage
necessity rides buses and street cars does not have the freedom that John Muir and Walt
Whitman extolled." Id.
158. See generally Emerson, supra note 155, at 230-3 1; Kauper 252.
It does not necessarily follow that a decision that a facility is a private social club under the
standards established by various courts in enforcing the public accommodations,laws, see notes
8-23 supra and accompanying text, necessitates finding such club immune from further anti-
discrimination laws. The standards developed in the public accommodations-private club cases
represent the judicial reaction to legislation which does not necessarily reach constitutional
limits. To allow the limitation of covered establishments to operate also as a constitutional
shield seems a strange way to determine constitutional limitations. It appears, therefore, that in
deciding whether a particular state or federal law proscribing discrimination is constitutionally
invalid that a consideration of its infringement on protected privacy must be made apart from
whether the law effects what are private social clubs according to traditional public
accommodations laws.
159. 381 U.S. at 485.
160. Id. at 497-98. Justice Goldberg cited Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), as
stating the proper test: "[Tihe State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling."
161. 381 U.S. at 502.
162. See note 157 supra and accompanying text. In a line of cases involving the right of
privacy as incident to the fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court has protected the reasonable expectation of privacy held by the accused. The
reasonableness of the expectation of privacy depends upon the situation into which an individual
voluntarily enters. Thus, the Court has said that a landlord cannot give the consent necessary to
validate a-warrantless search of a tenant's home, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961), and a hotel clerk cannot consent to the warrantless search of a guest's room, Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Justice Harlan
in a concurring opinion found that "an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home,
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relationship itself the decision to use contraceptive devices may be
entitled to greater protection than the decision to marry a first
cousin.11 In establishing the strength of the claim to privacy made by
the members of any particular social club such things as size, scope of
activity, intrusions into areas of public concern,' 4 and perhaps the
actual intimacy of the social associations involved must be
considered.
The Interest of the State
If the doctrine of Railway Mail Association v. Corsi15 is capable
of analogical extension, it might be suggested that the policies of the
fourteenth amendment are entirely consistent with state legislation
which limits the practice of racial and religious discrimination by
private organizations. The limitations on such an extension are
obvious. That case involved a labor union which was the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees within the unit. The Court
recognized that the excluded employees would not only be deprived of
any voice in their economic representation but also would be bound
by any contract made by the dominant union. The case suggests,
nevertheless, that the state has a substantial and legitimate interest in
proscribing discrimination in private associations. 6
and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."
Id. at 360 (citations omitted).
163. Every state prohibits intra-family marriages within some degree of relationship. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-103 (1947); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 89 § I (Smith-Hurd 1966); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Anderson
Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5(i) (1965).
164. Seenotes 174, 183 infra.
165. 326 U.S. 88 (1945). See note 135 supra for a more detailed discussion of the case.
166. [A] State may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of
American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another's
hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such State power would
stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private
prejudices as to race, color, or creed, in relations like those now before us ought not to
have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area
of non-discrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts. 326 U.S. at 98
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Although labor organizations have been considered private associations with unimpeachable
control over their individual membership policies, see, e.g., Oliphant v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Engineermen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935
(1959); Note, Constitutional Law-Racial Discrimination-Admission to Membership In
Certied Trade Union Is Purely A Private Concern, 27 Gao. WASH. L. Rv. 730 (1958), the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits a labor organization from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
1213
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Strength of Privacy Interest in the Private Social Club
A familiar analogy is that the private club is an extension of the
home and that an individual is entitled to all the privacy in his club
that he is entitled to in his home."1 By that analogy the state could no
more require non-discrimination as to whom a person invites into his
club than it could require non-discrimination as to whom a person
invites into his home. The analogy is weak in that it fails to distinguish
different varieties of private clubs. As a result the right of privacy has
been distorted, and there has been a tendency to assume that any
group which is exempt from public accommodations laws as a private
club and wants to exclude some racial or religious group is also
protected by the right to privacy. For example, in Clover Hill
Swimming Club, Inc. v. GoldsboroI"a membership swim club owned
and operated by a corporation and not the membership was held to be
a public accommodation within the New Jersey public
accommodations law which exempted "bona fide private clubs.""'
The club was limited to 400 families by zoning requirements. Had the
club been owned and operated by the membership, it presumably
would not have been subject to the public accommodations laws, 7
and a mechanical application of the home-club analogy would have
deemed that Clover Hill owed its existence to the associational
preferences of the members rather than their interest in the facilities
offered by the proprietors. Recently, in Bell v. Kenwood Golf &
Country Club, Inc.71 a federal district court in Maryland held that
under the totality of the facts Kenwood Golf & Country Club was not
167. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 312-13 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Rice, Federal Public Accommodations Law: A Dissent, 17 MERCER L. REv. 338, 343 (1966).
The home is used as the "horrible" example of state interference in the homeowner's choice of
his guests by the opponents of public accommodations laws and the expansion of the concept of
state action to reach many forms of racial and religious discrimination. For criticism of this
recurring straw man see Selard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit
on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 870-71 (1966). The appropriate
question is whether the social club is a "private place" deserving of the same measure of
constitutional protection as is afforded the home.
168. 47 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966).
169. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1-5 (1960).
170. The court in Clover Hill explained:
The statutory exemption for distinctly private organizations is designed to protect the
personal associational preferences of its members. However, Clover Hill does not owe its
existence to the associational preferences of its members but the coincidence of their
interest in the facilities offered by the owner, 46 N.J. at 34, 219 A.2d at 166.
171. 312 F. Supp. 753 (D. Md. 1970).
[Vol. 1970:1181
Vol. 1970:1181] PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
a private club within the private club exemption of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The club differed from most other country clubs in that
it was organized and operated by a corporation for profit and the
2,700 members had no voice in the admission of new members, the
expulsion of existing members, or the guest policies of the club.
Kenwood was subject to the public accomodations laws, despite the
fact that it was a bona fide social club. Because Kenwood was like so
many "private" social clubs in all respects except that it was operated
for a profit,172 the decision may imply that the rights of privacy in
private social clubs are subordinate to the will of the legislature and
the public interest in eliminating racial and religious discrimination.
If indeed all private clubs should not be treated like the home,
several factors suggest themselves as guidelines for evaluating the
strength of associational interests of the members of any particular
private social club.
Size. As a general rule it might be postulated that the smaller the
club the greater the privacy interests are of any particular member.
This distinction facilitates differentiation between the four couple
bridge club and the suburban country club and between the Friday
afternoon neighborhood coffee club and the city men's eating club.
The size of the club is at least a preliminary indicator of the
importance placed by each member upon compatible association with
most other members. Where there is reason to believe that the
economical use of some commonly owned facilities is of greater
importance to each individual member than the identity of most other
club members, less concern for privacy interests is justifed. 173
Scope of Activity and Intrusion into Areas of Public Concern.74
The club that enters the field of commerce by selling food, drink, or
other commodities, facilities, or services to its members or their guests
may occupy a different position from clubs not operated as
businesses. In a far reaching anti-discrimination law the Virgin
Islands prohibits discrimination in any organization which "...
172. Approximately 10 percent of the country clubs in the United States in 1962 were not
owned and operated by the members. See note 26 supra.
173. Using the numbers from the 1962 Anti-Defamation League Survey, see note 47 supra
and accompanying text, the'average country club surveyed had 506 members and the average
city club surveyed had 817 members.
174. "Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it
of public consequence, and affect the community at large." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125
(1879). See also Douglas, J., note 183 infra.
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enters the field of business and commerce by selling food or drink or
any other commodity .... "15 In such a club that chooses to sell
food or drink or other commodities to its members and their guests or
which operates under some license of the state" 6 the discrimination is
no longer limited to associational restrictions but extends to economic
discrimination restricting the availability of goods and services to
those discriminated against. The practical result is that solely because
of racial or religious heritage the dollars of one man are unable to
purchase for himself or his family the goods, services, and use of
facilities that the dollars of another man may purchase.
The influence of private social clubs on areas of public concern is
manifested in several other ways. The residents of many urban and
growing suburban areas find country and recreational clubs desirable
both because they provide needed recreational facilities and preserve
aesthetically pleasing open land. Encouragement for such enterprises
is provided by favorable assessment and taxation laws.' In addition,
private country and recreational clubs host national sporting events
and downtown clubs host civic dinners.
Perhaps the most significant public aspect of the many private
social clubs today is their business function. The availability and
extensive use of business expense tax deductions7 8 is tacit recognition
175. VIRGIN IS. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 2-3 (1961).
176. In the Kenwood case, see notes 171-72 supra and accompanying text, one of the facts
which led the Court to conclude that Kenwood Golf & Country Club was not deserving of the
designation of private club was that "1t]he corporation and the club [had] obtained other
necessary licenses and permits for the club's activities." 312 F. Supp. at 757.
177. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(e) (1969), which provides for special assessment
for country club property. The court in Kenwood noted also that the club there had benefited
from favorable zoning. 312 F. Supp. at 757. In Montgomery County, Maryland, this subsidy
amounts to between $130,000 and $170,000 for 18 clus according to a report prepared by one
of Ralph Nader's associates. See Washington Post, Dec. 27, 1970, § B, at 1, col. 7, at 5. Under
section 501(c)(7), of the Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, "[c]lubs organized and operated exclusively
for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder" are exempt from corporate tax. It is interesting
to note that while the exemption from taxation for discriminatory private schools has been
withdrawn, see IRS Press Release, Aug. 2, 1967, 1967 CCH STD. FED. TAX REP. 6734. See
also Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nora. Coit v.
Green, 39 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Jan. 12, 1971) (No. 820), the exemption for discriminatory private
clubs has remained. See also Washington State Liquor Control Board, Rules and Regulations
No. 26, which allows the private club to purchase liquor for sale to its members from the state
authority at a reduced rate.
178. Under section 274 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, certain entertainment, amusement,
and recreation expenses are deductable when they are directly related to, or precede or follow a
substantial business discussion associated with the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or
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of the business function performed by most private clubs. The
concentration of political and economic power in many private social
clubs not only makes membership essential for many businessmen but
also may dictate some companies' hiring and promotion practices. 79
Statutory guarantees of equality of employment opportunity'8s may
become hollow when the disability imposed by discriminatory
membership practices of the town's leading clubs prevents the
promotion of a black or Jewish executive. As the private club affects
the public either in the recreation or commercial sense, the protected
privacy interests would seem naturally to decrease. Such a club
becomes more an extension of a man's business than his home.
Because the privacy interest of the typical private country club,
eating club, or athletic club is small and' the state's interest in
eradicating racial and religious discrimination is substantial and
legitimate, legislation such as that adopted by Maine, which prohibits
racial and religious discrimination by those licensed to serve food or
drinks, or incorporated or licensed to do business within the state,8 t
appears to be a valid exercise of a state's licensing power.
OTHER LEGISLATIVE PROSPECTS
To this point the discussion has centered upon possible
constitutional objections to legislative discouragement of racial and
religious discrimination by private social clubs. A conclusion that
constitutional protection for the racial and religious discrimination
practiced by many private clubs is at best limited leads logically to an
inquiry into the type of legislative or judicial action that might be
constitutionally appropriate to discourage such discrimination.
State
The Maine statute182 seeks to discourage racial and religious
discrimination by denying state licenses or incorporation privileges to
individuals or groups which discriminate on racial or religious bases.
Although this is a logical primary remedy because of the possibility
business. Meals at a club and guest use charges qualify for the deduction if they can be related-to
conduct of the taxpayer's business. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.274-2(0(2) (1970).
179. See notes 38-39, 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964). See
generally M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
(1966).
181. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
182. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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that such licensing could be found to represent "state action,"I3 it
may not be the most appropriate. A private club having no need for a
state license.escapes the law when its privacy interests arguably may
be no stronger than those clubs requiring a license. State laws based
upon various state constitutional provisions which guarantee the right
to make contracts or acquire property ' " are preferable to licensee
restrictions. Of course, these laws must necessarily account for the
legitimate privacy interests which attend the existence of some private
clubs."
State legislation, however well drawn, is limited in its application.
The likelihood of achieving national coverage relying on state
initiative is small as evidenced by the continued absence of public
accommodations laws in thirteen states.' 6
Federal
Expanded notions of federal legislative power in the Civil Rights
area suggest several possible bases for new federal legislation to curb
racial and religious discrimination in private clubs. The commerce
power, the basis for the public accommodations section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,181 could be used to prohibit discrimination in
those private clubs which affect interstate commerce. Not only do
most private clubs have out-of-state members, but the food they serve
and much of the equipment they use moves or has moved in interstate
183. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), prior to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, found state action in the licensing of a retail store to operate a
segregated lunch counter and noted that "restaurants in Louisiana have a 'public consequence'
and affect the community at large." Id. at 183. Furthermore, he stated that
[o]ne can close the doors of his home to anyone he desires. But one who operates an
enterprise under a license from a government enjoys a privilege that derives from the
people. . . . Ir]he necessity of a license shows that the public has rights in respect to
those premises. The business is not a matter of mere private concern. Id. at 184-85.
But see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 333 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). For more detailed
discussion of this theory see Comment, Current Developments in State Action and Equal
Protection of the Law, 4 GONZAGA L. REV. 233,270 (1969); Note, Constitutional Law-Private
Club Discrimination, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 595, 597-602. See generally Selard, A Constitutional
Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM,
L. REv. 855, 870-72 (1966).
184. See. e.g., CALIF. CONsT. art. I, § 1; MASS. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
185. For one suggested method of legislating in this area while protecting desirable privacy
interests see text accompanying note 196 infra.
186. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. The states without such laws are Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1964).
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commerce.lss The commerce clause, however, is a rather disingenuous
basis,'89 especially in light of the alternatives available. Use of the
commerce power is subject to the difficulties and delay attendant in
determining whether an establishment affects interstate commerce1'"
and does not frankly admit that the federal government has broad
powers to proscribe seemingly private discrimination.19'
The thirteenth amendment to the Constitution outlaws slavery and
further provides that"Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation."' 192 Possibly, the widespread
exclusion of blacks from certain private social clubs is so serious a
form of discrimination as to be termed a badge or vestige of slavery
appropriate for elimination by Congress. 1" 3
Likewise, the enabling section of the fourteenth amendment
authorizes Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation"' the
equal protection provisions of section 1 of that amendment. Whether
the section permits legislation only with respect to state action which
denies equal protection or due process or whether Congress may
reach private discrimination under section 5 is the subject of substan-
tial controversy."s5 It is unlikely, however, that properly drawn federal
legislation based either on the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments
would be held unconstitutional.
188. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305, 308 (1969).
189. See Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
190. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
191. In Heart ofA tlanta, the Court upheld Title I 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a proper
exercise of the commerce power. Justice Douglas, concurring, indicated that he would have
preferred to have upheld the law as a proper exercise of congressional power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment. He felt that state enforcement of trespass laws to keep public
accommodations segregated provided the requisite "state action." Id. at 280.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
193. In Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court indicated that Congress
had broad power to define "badges of slavery" under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment. Id.
at 439-44. For the suggestion that racial discrimination in private social clubs may be a badge of
slavery, see Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. Rv. 470, 502. The court in
Kenwood considered this argument but specifically refused to base its decision on these grounds.
312 F. Supp. at 758. Congressional action under the thirteenth amendment, however, unlike the
fourteenth, is limited to racial discrimination.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
195. Several members of the Court have indicated that Congress pursuant to section 5 of the'
fourteenth amendment may legislate to reach private actions where there is no state involvement
at all. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring, joined by
Black & Fortas, JJ.); 383 U.S. at 781-84 (Brennan, J., partially dissenting, joined by Warren,
C.J. & Douglas, J.). Whether "this was the original understanding has been the subject of
considerable discussion. See authorities collected in Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YAm L.J. 1353 nA (1964).
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Legislation in this area not resting on the artificial grounds of
licensing or interstate commerce should look to the essence of the
relationship. Where the essence of membership is essentially the
exchange of money for goods, services, or the use of facilities, the
association is an appropriate object of legislation"' based upon the
philosophy that there should be no racial or religious distinctions
between what men may buy with their dollars.1 7 Using this criterion,
an adequate distinction can be drawn between an extension of a man's
home and an extension of his dealings in the market place to satisfy
the requirements of the right to privacy.
JUDICIAL PROSPECTS
In the absence of legislation, pressure on the judiciary to narrow
the private club exception to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been
increasing. A slight expansion of the "state action" concept could be
made to include any associational activity licensed by the states.' 5
Perhaps the most potent weapon available, howeve', is the Civil
Rights Act of 1866."' In the landmark case of Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.2 the Supreme Court held that section 1982202 of the Act
reached beyond state action to regulate the unofficial acts of private
individuals. Since most clubs are owned by the members, a denial of
196. See Larson, supra note 193, at 502. For another apparently less restrictive approach see
Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. CIV.
RIoHTs-Civ. LIB. L. Rav. 460,469-70 (1970).
197. As the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), noted:
Negro citizens . . . would be left with "a mere paper guarantee" if Congress were
powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a
dollar in the hands of a white man. At the very least, the freedom that Congress is
empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy
whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. Id. at 443.
198. For a discussion of licensing as state action see note 183 supra. In Irvis v. Moose Lodge
No. 107, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970), the court found state action where a
discriminatory private club purchased liquor from the state at a discount under the terms of a
liquor license granted by the state, was subject to extensive control by the state liquor authority,
and was required by the state to "adhere to all the provisions of its constitution and by-laws,"
and where one of the provisions in the club's constitution was a "whites only" clause.
199. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by Act of May 31, 1870, ch.
114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140. The Act is presently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981-82 (1964).
200. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27). The Act provides:
[C]itizens, of every race and color ... shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts ... [and] to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property ... any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. Id.
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the right to join because of race is arguably a denial of the right to
"purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."0 Subsequently, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting ParkM the
Court held that section 1982 applied to the refusal of a nonstock
corporation which operated a community park and playground to
approve an assignment of a membership share to a black assignee.
Likewise, section 1981 of title 422 has been held to apply to
private discrimination.2 Since the relationship between a club and
its members may be described as contractual in many respects, this
section could possibly be applied to force a club to end its discrimina-
tory policies.2
CONCLUSION
Public policy notions of inalienable individual liberty undoubtedly
must play a significantrole in determining the breadth of
associational privacy wheri the state attempts to promote social,
economic, and political equality. Because of the magnitude of the
impact of the private social club in American life, it is doubtful that
either political or economic equality can be achieved without some
measure of equal access to club benefits. Attempts to legislate social
equality should be drawn narrowly to preserve a necessary measure of
202. A more detailed discussion of sections 1981 aid 1982 as they may be applicable to the
discrimination practiced by the private social club may be found in 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHrs-CIv.
LIB. L. REV., supra note 196, at 461-63.
203. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and no other.
205. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970). See generally
5 HARV. Civ. RimHTs-Civ. LIE. L. REv.,'supra note 196, at 462, n.12. There is some contro-
versy as to whether section 1981, like section 1982, is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866
or 1870. Compare Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442 n.78 (1968) (dicta) and
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476,482 (7th Cir. 1970), with Cook v. The Adver-
tiser Co., - F. Supp. - (M.D. Ala. 1971). The derivation may be significant as the 1866 Act
was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment while portions of the 1870 Act are based
upon the fourteenth amendment. Section 1982 is clearly derived from the 1866 Act and Jones
dealt with 1982 and may therefore be inapplicable to section 1981. See Note, Is Section 1981
Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?. 1970 DuKE L.J. 1223.
206. See 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. Lia. L. REv., supra note 196, at 462; 1970 Wis. L.
REV., supra note 183, at 605-06.
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associational privacy, but they should be drawn. Whether this society
is capable of free evolution to social equality seems irrelevant in light
of the influence of the social club in perpetuating general racial and
religious economic and social inferiority and in light of the urgent
need for reversal of racial polarization. Many private social clubs
have become so affected with the public interest that some regulation
of their membership practices is not only a proper but also a necessary
exercise of legislative power.
